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 Los trabajos de C. Castrodeza, de entre los cuales este libro supone la culminación, 
constituyen una referencia singular e indiscutible en un panorama intelectual como el 
español muy poco atento a la sensibilidad científica naturalista. “La darwinización del 
mundo” es un texto valiente y atrevido, que hace pensar y ofrece nuevas claves para 
comprender la realidad humana sin renunciar ni a la radicalidad del pensamiento fi-
losófico ni al rigor científico.  
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FABIENNE PETER & HANS BERNHARD SCHMID, eds. 2007. Rationality and Commitment. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Amartya Sen's “Rational Fools” (1977) is nowadays one of the most cited and com-
mented works in the field of rational choice theory (RCT). Although Sen has devel-
oped his views in greater depth in subsequent works, his initial claim has not lost its 
critical power. 
 From Sen's point of view, commitment cannot be accommodated in RCT explana-
tions because it opens a wedge between welfare and choice. In “Rational Fools”, Sen 
argued that we must distinguish between two separate concepts: sympathy and com-
mitment. The former corresponds to the case in which the concern for others directly 
affects one’s own welfare: “If the knowledge of tortures of others make you sick, it is 
a case of sympathy; if it does not make you feel personally worse off, but you think it 
is wrong and you are ready to do something to stop it, it is a case of commitment” 
(Sen 1977, 319). Later, in “Goals, Commitment and Identity” (1985), Sen developed 
the theoretical distinction between self-centered welfare, self-welfare goal, and self-
goal choice, and placed this distinction in the core of RCT models. He argues that 
sympathy only violates the self-centered welfare condition, because the welfare of oth-
ers influences our own welfare. RCT can easily explain this kind of “altruism”, due to 
the fact that an agent's welfare increases by making other's welfare increase as well. 
Sen argues that commitment involves making a choice which violates either the RCT 
requirement of self-welfare goal or self-goal choice. Sen claims that “commitment is 
concerned with breaking the tight link between individual welfare (with or without 
sympathy) and the choice of action (for example, being committed to help remove 
some misery even though one personally does not suffer from it)” (Sen 1985, 7-8). 
 Rationality and Commitment is the result of a workshop that was held in the Uni-
versity of St. Gallen in May 2004. It collects a series of essays that aim to discuss Sen's 
critique of the implicit selfishness of a narrow interpretation of rational agency, under 
the light of the recent development that RCT has experienced, as well as the debates 
on rationality and collective agency than have taken place in philosophy. 
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 This volume is divided in three sections. Under the heading ‘Committed Action’, 
the first three chapters are devoted to explore the relation between commitment, 
choice and preference, starting from Sen’s review of his concept of commitment 
(Chapter 1). Following Sen, sympathy would violate self-centered welfare (due to the 
fact that the agent's welfare depends on the welfare of others), whereas commitment 
can imply modifying the agent's goals in a way that she does not pursue her own wel-
fare (therefore violating the self-welfare goal principle), as well as altering the agent's 
choice by incorporating other person's goals (therefore violating the self-goal choice). 
Sen argues that commitment is important to understand and rethink rationality for 
two reasons. First, rationality should take note of conduct that may not be congruent 
with the pursuit of one’s own goals and one’s own welfare, no matter how broadly 
characterized. Second, commitment can help to explain many patterns of behaviour 
that we actually observe and that are hard to fit into the narrow format of RCT. In 
Chapter 2, Pettit focus on Sen’s characterization of commitment as a violation of the 
self-goal choice assumption. Drawing a distinction between goal modifying and goal 
displacing, Pettit argues that, while the modification of an agent’s goals in order to 
consider other people’s goals is quite common, the possibility of acting in order to at-
tain a goal that the agent does not have is highly implausible: the notion of agency en-
tails a relation between an agent’s goals and actions. While goal displacing requires a 
departure from RCT, goal modifying can be accommodated by modelling the delibe-
ration process that allows agents to include other agent’s goals as owns. Hausman 
(Chapter 3), too, believes that commitment can be accommodated within the RCT 
framework. If preferences are seen as all-things-considered rakings, then commitment 
does not entail counter-preferential choice. Rather, Hausman argues, commitment 
should be invoked as one of the preference formation mechanisms, this is, as a kind 
of motivation, among others. 
 ‘Rethinking Rationality’ is the second part of the book, and includes a collection of 
reflections around the relationship between rationality and commitment, both within 
and from outside RCT. Pauer-Studer (Chapter 4) compares humean versus kantian 
accounts of rationality, and argues that Sen would fall under the category of a mod-
erate kantian. She argues that a broader conception of instrumental rationality that 
does not entail self-interest rationality, and can be compatible with a formal model 
such as RCT. In Chapter 5, Brennan makes a distinction between two accounts of ra-
tional agency: as an ‘approach’ and as a theory. The rational agent account does not 
make any assumption about what the content of the agent’s preferences is, but rather 
explores the formal restrictions on the structure of preferences. Then, through the 
analysis of two of Sen’s examples (the voting problem and the boys and the apples ex-
ample of committed action) Brennan concludes that the characterization of commit-
ment as a counter-preferential choice is misleading. From a similar point of view, 
Güth and Kliemt (Chapter 6) also advocate for a distinction between a formal frame-
work (what they call ‘Rational Choice Modelling’) and a theory of rationality, as the 
RCT (which would include some assumptions about the content of the agent’s prefe-
rences). They argue that commitments can be accommodated in Rational Choice 
Modelling, by modifying the rules in the game, either through a payoff modification, 
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or through the elimination or addition of moves. Verbeek’s contribution (Chapter 7) 
brings together Sen’s approach and Elster’s theory of pre-commitments, and discusses 
the intertemporal dimension of rationality and choice. Verbeek argues that commit-
ment has both a causal and a normative dimension. Elster’s pre-commitment devices 
consist in raising the cost of performing an action in the future, but from his point of 
view, making a decision is costless. Verbeek argues against this claim: choosing a path 
of action provides the agent a new reason for acting as decided, thus making com-
mitments rational, independently of the payoff structure at the time of performing the 
action. In the eighth and last chapter of this section, Gächter and Thöni overview the 
empirical research in cooperation problems such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the 
public goods game, which reflect a much higher rate of cooperation than theoretically 
predicted. The observed results, they argue, do not contradict the RCT model, but 
they challenge the universal selfishness assumption. 
 In the third part of the book (‘Commitment, Intentions and Identity’), we find a 
series of contributions which explore the relationship between commitment and col-
lective intentionality. Schmid (Chapter 9) argues that, in order to include commitment 
in the explanation of action, it is not enough to widen our concept of motivation: rea-
sons, and not motivations, are the basis of committed action, which has to do with 
shared goals, holding a normative relation with individual contributive goals. Shared 
goals are the source of reasons for action, which are neither internal nor external, in 
Williams’ terminology, but “transcend one’s subjective motivational set” (p. 222). In 
Chapter 10, Tuomela develops some aspects of his theory of social action, based on 
the distinction between the I-mode and the we-mode perspectives. He argues that 
standard game theory is concerned about I-mode cooperation, and cannot capture the 
kind of cooperation between individuals from the we-mode. Commitment inside 
groups, Tuomela argues, can be explained by analyzing the group’s preferences and 
goals, and how individuals contribute to the promotion of the group’s view, its Ethos. 
From a similar perspective, Gilbert (Chapter 11) focuses on the concept of joint 
commitment, which she has developed in several previous works. She claims that col-
lective action has an intrinsic normative dimension: agents commit their wills to per-
form their part in a joint action, binding themselves through the recognition of their 
agreement (whether implicit or explicit) as a “sufficient reason to act in accordance 
with the commitment” (p. 267). Gold and Sudgen (Chapter 12) review different ap-
proaches to team reasoning, which attempt to explain two puzzles of game-theoretical 
explanations: the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Hi-Lo game. Theories that are based on 
an individual account of agency may use payoff transformation, or preference patterns 
(instead of unique preference rankings) in order to explain the experimental results in 
these games; Gold and Sudgen, however, argue that focusing on team (rather than in-
dividual) agency allows to introduce team reasoning, which performs better in explain-
ing these puzzles. In the last Chapter of the book, Davis explores the implications of 
Sen’s critique to the problem of the identity of the agents. He analyses Sen’s views on 
social identification, and review Bernard William’s concept of commitment as identity-
conferring. He argues that the reflexive dimension of commitment, related to the ca-
pacity of reasoned self-scrutiny, is constitutive of the agents’ identity. 
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The final section of the book is a comment by Amartya Sen on the contributions col-
lected in the volume. He discusses the views of the different contributors, focusing his 
answers on Pettit’s and Hausman’s chapters. 
 Overall, Rationality and Commitment collects much of the recent debate around 
the challenge posed by Sen more than three decades ago: what the relevance of com-
mitted action is in the explanations of behavior, and how to reconcile commitment 
and rationality in order to provide a more realistic picture of human motivation and 
action. The contributions in this book, including Sen’s introduction and concluding 
remarks, have the capacity of summing up the current state of a problem that is still 
present both in philosophy and economics, allowing the reader to approach a contro-
versy that is far from being settled. Nonetheless, sometimes the reader might think 
that some of the topics this book covers are weakly interconnected, or somehow in-
dependent. This is due to the difficulty in dealing with problems that are interdiscipli-
nary in nature, and also to the fact that the concept of commitment is used in very dif-
ferent contexts, as Gilbert points out (p. 261). Most of the essays in this book discuss 
the different implications of Sen’s concept of commitment, but some of them broa-
den the term, especially those concerning collective intentionality. However, I think 
that the ambiguity of the concept of commitment reflects the present state of the dis-
cussion, and not considering other uses of the concept would limit the scope of this 
volume. In brief, it is not only a review of Sen’s critique, but also a useful introduction 
to a problem that is central to the explanations of human agency. 
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